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Despite the recent characterizations of the Naxalite movement 
as India’s “bloody class war” in the New York Times or as 
the country’s “greatest internal security threat,” the history 
of the struggle defies simple categorization. Although the 
movement began as a peasants’ rebellion in Naxalbari in 1967 
and was supported by the Communist Party of India (Maoist), 
its social origins cannot be reduced to class conflict alone. 
This difficulty is due to the complexity and variability of its 
social bases over the last four decades, as well as the changing 
nature of the state. This paper calls for a new interpretation 
of the movement and its relationship to the state: situating 
the struggle within the context of the development of Indian 
state from “a reluctant pro-capitalist state that flirted with 
socialism” after 1947 to “an enthusiastic pro-capitalist state 
with a neo-liberal ideology” in the 1980s. Through interviews, 
archival research and secondary sources, this paper hopes 
to demonstrate that while national and state-level policies 
of security and development have structured strategies of 
resistance taken up by the Naxals, these strategies have in 
turn shaped the Indian state from below. This paper uses a 
synthetic mode of analysis, paying special attention to gender, 
caste and religion as well as the mediating influences of post-
coloniality and neoliberal globalization. 
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Introduction
Despite the recent characterizations of the Naxalite movement 
as India’s “bloody class war” in the New York Times or as the 
country’s “greatest internal security threat” by then-Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh in 2010, the long history of the 
struggle defies simple categorization1. Although the movement 
began as a peasants’ rebellion in Naxalbari in 1967 and was 
supported by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), its 
social origins cannot be reduced to class conflict alone. The 
complexity and variability of its social bases over nearly five 
decades, as well as the changing nature of the state, explain 
the difficulty of adequately theorizing about the Naxalite 
movement.
The Naxalite movement has continued in phases over the 
last 47 years and was most recently reborn under the aegis 
of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2003 and 2004. 
The present-day iteration undoubtedly shares a lineage with 
the early years of the struggle: namely, the involvement of 
a communist party, the quotidian experiences of poverty, 
inequality and structural violence for the people in the 
so-called “Red Corridor” region, the use of terrains that 
are more suitable for guerrilla warfare than elsewhere in 
India, a persistent and significant adivasi base, et cetera2.  
Nevertheless, there are significant differences as well, both 
in the way the struggle is theorized and fought on the ground 
and the way it is thought and written about in the media, 
parliamentary debates and security briefings at the two levels 
of government and academic literature. 
This particular paper focuses on the first three years of 
Naxalbari from 1967 to 1969 and attempts to make some 
comments on the political character of the movement and 
state responses at this time. Despite the ample production of 
literature in the wake of the 2000s phase of the movement, 
similar systematic studies are difficult to find for earlier periods 
of the struggle. To fill the gap in the accounts of the early years 
of the insurrection, this paper situates the Naxalite struggle 
within the context of the dramatic developments in the Indian 
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state form over the last five decades. This is particularly 
significant in the Naxalite case as its first few years were 
during a crucial transitional period for the Indian state: the 
tumults of the late 1960s and early 1970s were critical to 
transforming “a reluctant pro-capitalist [Indian] state that 
flirted with socialism” after 1947 to “an enthusiastic pro-
capitalist state with a neo-liberal ideology” in the 1990s3. 
Over the past five decades, in intended and inadvertent ways, 
the Naxalite movement has not only altered state strategies 
on how it should relate to and rule its rural population, but 
the uprising has also changed how the limbs and mechanisms 
of the state relate to each other4. Examining state reactions 
to the first three years of the insurrection crystallizes the 
fact that the Naxalite movement was a key event for Indian 
federalism: it figured prominently in debates over the 
allocation of powers, jurisdiction and responsibilities in 
India’s federalist arrangement and configured future central-
local relations. Nevertheless, despite the presence of many 
axes of hostility between the centre and the states, the 
central government’s assessment of the Naxalites as security 
threats and its containment policy consisting of danda, 
daroga and data were largely embraced by the states in their 
efforts to tame and deter the movement. Examining the 
Indian state’s reactions to Naxalbari in its disaggregated form 
in the context of centre-state relations thus also elucidates 
the genealogy of the securitization discourse vis-à-vis the 
Naxalite movement that has become increasingly dominant 
in recent years.
Methodology: Content and Geospatial Analysis
Due to the overt involvement of police personnel in the 
“originating” episode of Naxalbari and the movement’s 
conspicuous claims-making on the state, the intimate 
relationship between the Naxalite uprising and the state has 
been highly visible in media reports. Much of the analysis 
of the resultant changes in state form related in this paper 
is informed by the content analysis of 580 Times of India 
articles between 1967 and 1969. The articles were chosen by 
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conducting a search on the Proquest Times of India Historical 
Archives, 1838-2004, with the keyword “naxal*.” This returned 
all articles that contained terms such as Naxalite, Naxal and 
Naxalbari in the title or the content. The absence of online 
or physical access to other Indian newspaper archives meant 
that only the archives of the national editions of the English-
language daily, Times of India, between 1 January 1967 and 31 
December 1969 were searched for references to the unit of 
analysis “naxal*.” Given the resource and time constraints, the 
search was not extended to the archived local editions of the 
same newspaper on the Proquest database. 
The search results were coded chronologically by year and 
by type of actor. The latter was roughly coded to conform 
to the categories of Naxalites, different state governments, 
the central government, various communist party factions, 
other parties and a miscellaneous “other” classification. 
Additional specifics were retained in the columns entitled 
“Area,” “Actors” and “Details” so as to prevent context-
stripping as much as possible. The coding was completed 
by loosely keeping political scientist and communications 
theorist Harold Lasswell’s formulation of the core objectives 
of content analysis in mind: “Who says what, to whom, why, 
to what extent and with what effect?5” It was only “loosely” 
kept in mind because making neat demarcations between 
actors and those affected by their actions was not necessarily 
straightforward or even possible in some cases. Nonetheless, 
these newspaper reports were particularly illuminating vis-
à-vis the varying levels of tension between the centre and 
the states and the national security agenda espoused by the 
central government from the beginning of the movement.
Terrain has played an important role in many communist 
revolutions for tactical reasons6. It is not mere coincidence 
that the communist leader Charu Mazumdar described 
Srikakulam, one of the centres of Naxalite activity in Andhra 
Pradesh, as “a jungle surrounded by hills.” Nor is it surprising 
to find E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the communist Chief Minister 
of Kerala, characterizing Wynad in Kerala to be “ideally suited 
for the tactic of guerrilla warfare7.” Peoples living in forests, 
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wilderness, hills and frontier regions in India have long been 
automatically assigned to the administrative category and 
identity marker of tribals or adivasis8. While the classification 
of “tribal” or “adivasi” is not unproblematic or unitary, the 
Naxalite movement’s strong adivasi base strengthens the 
rationale for investigating its geospatial aspects. To visually 
represent the topography of the struggle, the content analysis 
dataset was uploaded to Google Maps Engine Lite and the 
data was mapped according to the years and the types of 
actors involved. The outputs consist of three maps for the 
years of 1967, 1968 and 1969. These maps provide the reader 
with insights into the role of terrain both as determinant and 
staging ground in the Naxalite movement and are discussed in 
the next section.
Mapping the Movement: 1967 to 1969
The eponymous episode of the Naxal struggle was the 
infamous police shooting of six women, one man and two 
children in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal on 25 May 
19679. Naxalbari is situated in northern West Bengal, near 
the borders of Nepal and Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). 
In 1967, many of the landless peasant and sharecropper 
population of the heavily agrarian area retained their tribal 
affiliation and were identified as Santhals in media reports. 
Months of clashes with landowners and police personnel, 
forcible occupation of land by peasants and organization by 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) cadres had preceded the 
now-iconic event. The immediate but short-lived response 
to the Naxalbari massacre in the media was to frame it 
as revenge for the May 4 murder of a police inspector by 
an arrow10. The following maps for 1967, 1968 and 1969 
demonstrate the gradual dispersion of the Naxalite revolution 
west- and south-ward from West Bengal. While West Bengal 
continued to be the epicentre of the struggle in the late 1960s, 
Kerala and Andhra Pradesh became important sites of Naxalite 
activity by the end of the 1960s. The maps also represent 
the intensity of the central and local governments’ security 
responses and communist party factionalism in each state. The 
insets for West Bengal, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh enable an 
5
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enlarged view of the terrain of the struggle.
1967
In the aftermath of the May 25 massacre, Naxalite activity 
spread throughout the northern region of West Bengal. The 
inset demonstrates that Naxalite actions were clustered 
around Naxalbari, while decisions by the West Bengal 
government and the communist politburo emanated from 
Calcutta. Although Naxalbari itself appears as a relatively flat 
agrarian region on the map, its northern reaches share the 
geographical attributes of the rocky, mountainous and the lush 
landscape of Sikkim. Naxalite activity occurred in far fewer 
numbers in Kerala and Andhra Pradesh than in West Bengal in 
1967.
1968
The 1968 map demonstrates the southbound dispersion of 
Naxalite activity and parliamentarian responses. West Bengal 
continued to experience a significant amount of Naxalite 
episodes in the agrarian plains between Sikkim and East 
Pakistan. Nevertheless, the struggle had moved to Kerala 
by 1967. The majority of Naxalite activities and such state 
responses as ministerial visits and police fortifications in Kerala 
were carried out in urban areas along the coast. A smaller 
number occurred in the rainforests adjacent to the Malabar 
Uplands, especially in Wynad.
6
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The Naxalite Movement in 1967 
Inset: West Bengal. 
[Computer map]. No scale given. 
AutoNavi, Basarsoft, Google, 
MapaGISrael, ORION-ME, SK 
Planet, Zenrin. Mountain View, CA: 
Google Maps11
1969
The 1969 map visually represents the changes in tempo and 
terrain, as well as the socio-demography of the struggle, 
between 1967 and 1969. The most conspicuous of these 
changes is the rather rapid dispersion of the movement in 
Andhra Pradesh. Of course, it is somewhat erroneous to 
consider Andhra Pradesh a homogeneous territory. The 
boundaries of the state have been in contention since 1947 
due to the incorporation of the culturally distinct Telangana 
region with Andhra Pradesh. In fact, after nearly half a 
century of agitations, the southwestern state was divided 
into Telangana and Andhra Pradesh with a joint capital in 
Hyderabad in July 201413. The map demonstrates that there 
were two parallel Naxalite movements in Andhra Pradesh. One 
arm was positioned around the central plains and agrarian 
landscape of the Telangana region. It built upon both the 
communist mobilization among peasants against landlordism 
from 1946 to 1949 and the contemporary demands for 
autonomous statehood for the region. The second strand 
of the movement was embedded in the elevated, forested 
agency area (denoting areas reserved for those deemed to be 
Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the Indian Constitution) 
in Srikakulam14. Two contributions to Desai’s Agrarian Struggles 
in India after Independence, Tarun Kumar Bannerjee’s “Girijan 
Movement in Srikakulam: 1967-70” and the National Labour 
7
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The Naxalite Movement in 1968 
Inset: West Bengal and Kerala. 
[Computer map]. No scale given. 
AutoNavi, Basarsoft, Google, 
MapaGISrael, ORION-ME, SK 
Planet, Zenrin. Mountain View, 
CA: Google Maps, 2014. Using 
Google Maps Engine Lite Beta [GIS 
software]. Mountain View, CA: 
Google12.
Institute (NLI) report entitled “Post-Independence Peasant 
Movements in Ryotwari Areas of Andhra Pradesh” confirm the 
bicephalic nature of the Andhra Pradesh Naxalite struggle at 
this time.
Regional and demographic bifurcations are also expressed 
in the 1969 West Bengal inset. While rural unrest continued, 
there was major mobilization and eruption of Naxalite activity 
in Calcutta. In the countryside landlords were deemed the 
primary class enemy, but in Calcutta the annihilation program 
targeted the police force and was carried on by lower middle- 
and middle-class urban youth. The map demonstrates that the 
West Bengal state responded with redoubled efforts: raids and 
executions by the police became a common occurrence on the 
streets of Calcutta in 196915. 
The Response of the Parliamentarians
From its inception, the Naxalite movement has had a 
profound effect on the state. As Corbridge et al. note in 
their introduction to Seeing the State: Governance and 
Governmentality in India, the Indian state often appears as 
a fuzzy entity when viewed from below and the state tends 
to see its subaltern subjects through just as blurry a lens17.  
Similar accounts of seeing the state and seeing like a state 
have recently been furnished by anthropologists Alpa Shah 
(2010) and Akhil Gupta (2012)18.  
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The Naxalite Movement in 1969 
Inset: West Bengal, Kerala, and 
Andhra Pradesh. 
[Computer map]. No scale given. 
AutoNavi, Basarsoft, Google, 
MapaGISrael, ORION-ME, SK 
Planet, Zenrin. Mountain View, 
CA: Google Maps, 2014. Using 
Google Maps Engine Lite Beta [GIS 
software]. Mountain View, CA: 
Google16.
The reactions of various parliamentary actors to the Naxalites 
often affected or underscored the evolution of the Indian 
state form in the late sixties. The responses emanating from 
Indira Gandhi’s central government and the state governments 
of West Bengal, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh illuminated the 
escalating crisis of Indian federalism, primarily brought on 
by the erosion of the Congress Party’s support base and 
the deaths of most of the anti-colonial nationalist leaders 
who had formed the party. Despite the unmistakeable 
tensions between the centre and the states, both adopted 
an increasingly repressive containment policy against the 
Naxalites that was more or less implemented through the 
mechanisms of danda, daroga and data.
Disciplining and Punishing the Naxalites: Conceptualizing 
Danda, Daroga and Data
The three primary disciplinary mechanisms used by the centre 
against its Naxalite challengers were danda, daroga, and data. 
Even as local governments resisted central assertions of power 
over what they deemed state affairs, they soon followed the 
containment model set out by the centre. The one notable 
exception to this pattern was the Andhra government’s 
necropolitical treatment of the adivasi Srikakulam rebels. 
Danda is most often translated as “punishment” in English 
and its meaning is related to and coextensive with the stick 
customarily used for meting out such punishment. In the 
context of Indian politics, it signifies a longstanding ruling 
principle. In Dominance without Hegemony, Ranajit Guha 
conceptualizes danda as an essential mode of dominance 
for both the ancient and the British colonial rulers in India. 
In the era of monarchical absolutism, danda represented 
“an ensemble of ‘power, authority and punishment.’” During 
the ruling period of the British Raj, the indigenous idiom of 
danda complemented the exported modernist imperative 
of order. The role of punishment was not simply seen as a 
convenient tool for imposing order, but it was considered to 
be the necessary condition that made order a possibility in the 
polity19.
9
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Despite the unmistakeable tensions 
between the centre and the states, 
both adopted an increasingly 
repressive containment policy 
against the Naxalites that was 
more or less implemented through 
the mechanisms of danda, daroga 
and data.
Much as their British predecessors had done against peasant 
insurgents in colonial India, Indira Gandhi’s cabinet extensively 
utilized the legal apparatus to mete out danda to the Naxalites 
to bring order20.  As early as July 1967, the central government 
negotiated with the West Bengal United Front government to 
issue a decree of specific sections of the Arms Act within the 
Siliguri subdivision. Y.B. Chavan, the Union Home Minister, 
requested the enforcement of Sections 4, 11 and 12 to ban the 
carrying and importation of such arms as bows, arrows, spears 
and rifles. When asked during a parliamentary debate why 
the central government was choosing to impose these three 
sections, the Home Minister noted that they carried much 
heavier penalties than breaches of Section 144, the customary 
legal code used in India against illegal bearing of arms21. By 
May 1968, the central government also pioneered the use of 
two acts against suspected Naxalites during the President’s 
Rule period in West Bengal between 1968 and 1969: the 
Preventive Detentions Act (Article 22), which enabled the 
government to detain alleged Naxalites without trial to 
maintain public order, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Act, which empowered them to impose restrictions on 
forming and meeting as a group or association in the name 
of protecting the sovereignty and integrity of India22. Despite 
a pitched battle between the states and the centre about 
jurisdiction, the government in West Bengal utilized the same 
legal codes against Naxalites and the Congress-led Andhra 
Pradesh government soon followed suit as well. The ruling 
principle of using danda to impose order could hardly have 
been clearer or less unselfconscious: in December 1968, 
Chavan declared that “if it became necessary, [the Naxalites 
would] be dealt with a danda23.” 
The literal English translation of daroga is police 
superintendent24. The police force has of course functioned 
as a central repressive state apparatus from the earliest 
moments of the modern state. In colonial and postcolonial 
India, a special relationship has existed between insurgents 
and darogas. As Guha demonstrates, conflation of rebellion 
with robbery and common civil offenses had been the 
defining colonial state response to agrarian uprisings25.  
10
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Orthodox historians’ interpretations have followed these state 
discourses and attempts at criminalization by darogas. In such 
a way, Indian historiography has been deeply structured by the 
daroga. According to Guha:
The daroga hence played a crucial discursive role in 
constructing the rebel as petty criminal, as well as an 
instrumental one, during the British colonial era.
Guha’s explication of the daroga as both a primary instrument 
of danda and a discursive bedrock that constructed and 
produced rebels as criminals is equally appropriate in the 
Naxalbari case. Arrests and indictments of Naxalites as 
dacoits, looters and murderers by darogas served to contain, 
criminalize and delegitimize the movement. The longer the 
Naxalite rebellion persisted, the more specially trained and 
extraordinarily empowered did such darogas become across 
West Bengal, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh27.  
Since the Naxalbari rebellion erupted due to the brutal death 
of 10 Santhal peasants in the hands of police officers, the 
West Bengal government was initially unwilling to counter 
Naxalite activity through the deployment of additional police 
personnel. On 12 June 1967, Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee 
ordered that the police use restraint in Naxalbari and 
surrounding areas28. By 4 July 1967, however, Mukherjee 
reversed his decision and issued orders for the police to enter 
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[A] powerful and sustained class struggle like the 
resistance of the Barasat or Pabna peasantry tends to 
invest the disparate attacks on property and person with 
new meanings and rephrase them as a part of a general 
discourse of rebellion. Consequently, each of these 
acts acquires an ambivalence: wired at the same time 
to two different codes—the code of individualistic or 
small-group deviance from the law where it originates 
and that of collective social defiance which adopts it—it 
bears the twin sign of a birth-mark and a becoming. It 
is precisely this duplex character which permits it to 
be interpreted one way or the other depending on the 
interpreter’s point of view. A daroga or a historian who 
thinks like a daroga would be inclined to interpret it in 
terms of its past and condemn it26. 
Naxalite stronghold areas “to prevent murder, raid, loot and 
molestation of women29.” In the aftermath of Naxalite attacks 
on police stations in Tellicherry and Pulpalli in Kerala, large 
numbers of darogas were deployed to apprehend the rebels 
and charge them with petty crimes. An unnamed top-ranked 
police officer publicly ridiculed some Wynad rebels who had 
attempted to attack the police station there and dismissed any 
revolutionary potential in their actions by commenting that 
“[r]evolutionaries do not run away at the sight of the police30.” 
Data constituted the last element of the disciplinary triad 
against the Naxalites from 1967 to 1969. During the content 
analysis process, it became clear that the majority of the news 
reports were as concerned with numerically representing 
the strength of the Naxalite movement, as they were with 
describing the nature of their activities. The central and state 
governments devoted considerable resources to making 
regular public announcements on the number of Naxalites 
killed, arrested and sentenced. Content analysis demonstrates 
that between 1967 and 1969, there were 43 such updates 
issued by the Union administration and local governments in 
Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, Orissa and Bihar. These 
data updates served a dual purpose: firstly, they attested to 
the absolute legibility of “the Naxalite problem” to the state 
and its efficiency in containing that problem; secondly, they 
strengthened the discursive trend of criminalizing the rebels 
and further deconstructed the socio-political character of the 
Naxalite combatants to produce them as an aggregate of raw 
data. 
In Seeing Like a State, political scientist James C. Scott 
theorizes that legibility is a set of techniques that is essential 
to the operation of every modern state because ruling first 
requires “reading” the subject population31. The central and 
local governments’ ability to render the Naxalite rebellion 
legible to themselves and to the public through extensive data 
collection on deaths, arrests, and sentencing confirmed their 
efficacy. In the face of the challenge posed by the Naxalites to 
the state, these data updates emphasized the state’s superior 
resources and ability and consequently legitimized its claim to 
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rule. Much like the darogas, the central and local governments 
used these announcements on arrests and sentencing of 
Naxalites to criminalize the rebels. Resorting to data also 
allowed these administrations to strip the Naxalite struggle of 
its intricate socio-political underpinnings. The compound social 
inequalities and political grievances that had given rise to the 
movement were discarded and deconstructed. The Naxalite 
insurgents were riven from their contexts and produced 
instead as an aggregate of raw data for public presentation; 
their complex and chaotic social hieroglyphics were ordered 
and translated to the standardized, nationally legible language 
of data. 
Donna Haraway has noted the following about the semiotics 
of science in her seminal essay on science, epistemology and 
objectivity called “Situated Knowledges”:
Data is neither necessarily reductive, nor always an act of 
meaning-breaking aimed at the subaltern. The central and 
local governments’ search for legibility and the consequent 
reduction of the Naxalite “problem” through data would be 
less problematic if it did not come at the expense of queries 
into the logic of the Naxalite uprising. Content analysis reveals 
that although investigations into land insecurity and inequality 
had been conducted by both central and local administrations 
during the early years of the rebellion in an effort to 
understand and redirect it, by 1969 such discussions became 
rarer and data updates became more frequent at all levels of 
government.
Federalism and Its Discontents
1967 marked the twentieth year of India as a postcolonial 
nation-state, having gained its independence from the British 
through a prolonged and fierce anti-colonial nationalist 
movement in 1947. India’s centralized federalism had a longer 
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Science has been about a search of translation, 
convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality – 
which [becomes] reductionism only when one language 
(guess whose?) must be enforced as the standard for all 
translations and conversions32. 
The central and local governments’ 
search for legibility and the 
consequent reduction of the 
Naxalite “problem” through data 
would be less problematic if it did 
not come at the expense of queries 
into the logic of the Naxalite 
uprising. 
history, however, and its origins were extremely contentious. 
The first time the Indian state was committed to a federation 
was during a crucial and particularly tense period of the 
nationalist movement in 1935. As a response to the Indian 
nationalists’ call for the establishment of self-rule, the British 
Raj had introduced the Government of India Act of 1935. By 
1967, the federalism experiment in India was still ongoing, but 
it was facing a severe crisis over the proper division of powers, 
jurisdictions, and responsibilities between the centre and the 
states. 
Between 1964 and 1967 these centre-state tensions were 
exacerbated by the so-called “passing of the tall men” 
phenomenon: by 1967, no charismatic leader from the 
nationalist movement was still living and no new leader equal 
in political acumen or magnetism appeared in their wake. 
The Indian National Congress (INC), considered the national 
party of India at this time, suffered an immense setback due 
to the death of Jawaharlal Nehru while in office in 1964 and 
then the passing of his successor, the esteemed Lal Bahadur 
Shastri, after 18 months. These were the volatile and uncertain 
circumstances under which Indira Gandhi assumed the 
helm of INC and the Prime Ministerial position in the Union 
government in 196633. The Congress was again returned to 
power in the 1967 general elections. Nevertheless, the 1967 
elections saw its base of support shaken for first time in the 
history of independent India, as the party only managed 40.7 
per cent of the votes in the Lok Sabha (the lower house in 
India’s bicameral parliament) and 40 per cent of the votes in 
the state assemblies.
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Table 1: Decline of Support for 
Congress (Centrally and in States), 
1947 to 1967
Source: India after Gandhi by 
Ramachandra Guha (2007)34 
Content analysis demonstrates that on at least 85 occasions 
over the three-year span of 1967 to 1969, the Naxalite 
movement was invoked as a justification for more central 
involvement in state governments or vice versa by a variety of 
parliamentary actors. While analyzing the first parliamentary 
debates reveals a more hesitant centre that had asked 
the West Bengal government for permission to send a 
parliamentary delegation, the tactics changed in a matter of 
two months35. By July 1967, the Central Congress Parliament 
Board reached a resolution that the party should play an active 
role in non-Congress-administered states in legislature and 
through grassroots activism36. The interventionist agenda of 
the Union government, especially as it concerned those states 
where Congress support had weakened significantly by the 
1967 elections, began to come to the fore in the context of the 
Naxalite movement.
The blow to the INC reverberated most strongly in the states 
with left-leaning parties with robust mass bases. By 1967, 
West Bengal had been a leftist stronghold for decades. 
Previous state legislative assembly elections had returned 
successive leftist coalition governments to power, although 
Congress had been included in these coalitions before 196737.  
The violent confrontations in Naxalbari on May 25 arose 
exactly a month after the election of the United Front coalition 
government in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly. Even 
though the (INC) had won the most seats (127), the breakaway 
INC faction of Bangla Congress, the Communist Party of India 
(CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM), the Praja 
Socialist Party (PSP), the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and a 
few independent elected officials formed the United Front (UF) 
government. Bangla Congress leader Ajoy Mukherjee assumed 
the position of Chief Minister and Jyoti Basu of CPM became 
the Deputy Chief Minister38. The coalition did not however 
emerge without considerable difficulty. CPM had split from the 
Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1963 because the CPI leaders 
had wanted to pursue a parliamentarian path and withdraw 
from revolutionary activity39. Thus, forming a coalition 
government became a cause for serious dispute within CPM 
leadership. The fissions within the United Front continued 
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after the formation of the coalition and provided the centre 
ample opportunities to extend its ideological reach into the 
state and to shore up support in the state and nationally as a 
strong, capable administration during a tremulous, uncertain 
epoch.
From the beginning, the relationship between the UF 
government and Indira Gandhi’s central administration was 
rife with conflict. One of the outcomes of this tension was 
the origination of the current discursive trend of identifying 
the Naxalite movement strictly as a security matter. The 
Congress-led Union government’s first response to the 
agitations was to label it as a “law and order” and security 
issue, partly due to Naxalbari’s proximity to the Nepalese and 
(East) Pakistani borders, as well as China-adjacent Sikkim40.  
Soon the perceived need to securitize the areas affected 
by the insurrection on the part of the central government 
became a ready tool for advancing talks of taking over specific 
functions of state governments or installing a provisional 
central government in those states41. These efforts and 
the fragmentation within the UF government eventually 
culminated in the application of the controversial Article 356 
and the imposition of President’s Rule from 1968 to 1969, 
which allowed for the central administration of West Bengal 
through the office of the Governor42.  
During the United Front’s first term in office, the visible 
centre-state tensions quickly presented an opportunity for the 
crumbling UF administration to shift responsibility, especially 
when it came to containing the Naxalites. Although in 1967 
Ajoy Mukherjee’s cabinet had repeatedly rebuffed central 
attempts at exerting control, as President’s Rule and then 
the 1969 elections drew near the UF government adopted 
a markedly different approach43.  From 1967 to early 1968, 
UF discourse was centred around Naxalbari being motivated 
by the peasantry’s land insecurity and painting the Union 
government as both an ill-equipped and illegitimate body for 
administering the political matters of West Bengal44.  
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After the re-election of the UF coalition and of Ajoy Mukherjee 
as Chief Minister, they appropriated a conciliatory attitude and 
collaborated with Indira Gandhi’s government. Even the CPM 
cabinet ministers such as Jyoti Basu and Hare Krishna Konar 
who had by-and-large supported progressive land policies 
and made an effort to hold Mukherjee’s administration 
accountable for using brutal tactics against the Naxalites in 
the first term, drew closer to the centre in their second term 
in office, even if their official rhetoric differed from that of the 
Union government45.  
The Naxalite insurgents were regarded first and foremost 
as petty criminals. Many of the strategies used by Governor 
Dharma Vira during President’s Rule, such as denying the 
Naxalite prisoners political status, were continued by the UF 
government after the 1969 elections despite frequent and 
prolonged hunger strikes46. Jyoti Basu, Deputy Chief Minister 
for a second consecutive term, declared in April that state 
consent was necessary for posting Central Reserve Police in 
West Bengal to deal with the Naxalites47.  
Nevertheless, other statements by Basu made it increasingly 
clear that while he supported decentralization and 
empowerment of the state governments, his views on 
securitizing the Naxal rebellion conformed to the centre’s 
perspective. He not only advocated strengthening the state’s 
police force, but also approved of giving rifles to “responsible” 
UF student militias to fight the Naxalites48. The UF 
government’s (and later the CPM government’s) recruitment 
and use of such “volunteer forces” to fight alongside the police 
continued all throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s49. By 
November 1969, he updated the public that Naxalites in West 
Bengal were non-existent by this point and existed only “in tea 
shops.” He further contended that no Naxalites were being 
held under the Preventive Detentions Act passed by the Union 
government since they had been captured and then charged 
with criminal offences instead by the UF administration50. The 
second UF government thus enthusiastically committed to 
the containment policy of danda and daroga outlined by the 
centre, while simultaneously advocating for decentralization.
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Before 1967, Kerala was the only state to have elected a 
non-Congress state government. In the 1967 elections, 
Congress’s support base in Kerala weakened even further. 
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) won 52 
seats out of 133 in the Keralan Legislative Assembly, INC 
won 30, and Communist Party of India (CPI) won 19. The 
communists formed a coalition and were led by CPM leader 
E.M.S. Namboodiripad, who retained his status as the only 
communist Chief Minister in India during his second term 
in office51. While the state-centre tensions were palpable in 
Kerala as well, they took a substantially different form in the 
southwestern state. Central interventions often took the form 
of curbing communist power, rather than directly focusing 
on the Naxalite movement, which had spread to Kerala by 
November 196752. Naxalite insurgency in Kerala itself took a 
markedly different route and manifested more mildly than 
in West Bengal or Andhra Pradesh. According to the content 
analysis, the 15 Naxalite eruptions between 1967 and 1969 
in Kerala mostly involved student and parliamentary-turned-
revolutionary leaders and seemed to lack the type of rural 
mass following evident in Bengal or Andhra. Aside from a few 
heated debates in the Lok Sabha, Indira Gandhi’s government 
remained surprisingly silent on the Naxalite insurgency in the 
state and focused their attentions instead on unseating Kerala 
as the epicentre of parliamentarian communism in India. The 
central government’s Kerala strategy was demonstrated when 
it interceded and denied permission to E.M.S. Namboodiripad 
as he attempted to visit the Democratic German Republic and 
other communist East European countries in 196853.  
For its part, the Marxist Kerala government used the police 
force and the courts to detain and demobilize Naxalites. 
Nevertheless, it was much less intent upon denying the 
political motivations of Naxalite prisoners than other states or 
the Union government. Miss Ajitha, one of the apprehended 
Naxalite leaders, was allowed to read Maoist literature while 
in solitary confinement. In March 1969, the Kerala government 
created a special class of political prisoners to try those 
charged with Naxalite activities such as the bombing of the 
police stations in Tellicherry (now Thalassery) and Pulpalli54.  
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For its part, the Marxist Kerala 
government used the police force 
and the courts to detain and 
demobilize Naxalites. Nevertheless, 
it was much less intent upon 
denying the political motivations 
of Naxalite prisoners than other 
states or the Union government.
On 9 April 1969, Chief Minister E.M.S. Namboodiripad 
dismissed CPI Chariman Dange’s suggestion that those 
apprehended for the Tellicherry and Pulpalli raids should be 
treated as “common criminals with no ideological political 
aims and objectives.” The CPM leader opined that such an 
action would amount to an unfair denunciation of the Naxalite 
rebels’ political motivations and betray his party’s Marxist 
leanings55. Public data updates formed a central strategy 
for the Kerala government. However, owing to their broad 
electoral success and exclusive parliamentary focus, unlike in 
West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, Namboodiripad’s updates 
concentrated less on the number of Naxalites who were dead 
or in detention and more on the numerical representation 
of CPM-Naxalite fragmentation. By the Chief Minister’s 
account in 1968, there was 25 per cent attrition within the 
Darjeeling-area Marxists due to the Naxalites and only three 
in the 35-member CPM Central Committee had resigned their 
positions in order to join the revolutionaries. He especially 
stressed that no CPM state committee member, in Kerala or 
elsewhere, had defected to the Naxalite cause56. 
Despite being an early focal point of Naxalite activity, Andhra 
Pradesh did not present a challenge to the centre. The 
Congress had won a clear majority with 165 seats in the 1967 
state legislative assembly elections57. While the CPM or the CPI 
was not well-represented in the Andhra Pradesh legislature, 
the communists had a large following in the Telangana region 
and in the Srikakulam Agency Area. Telangana had been the 
site of a major peasant movement between 1946 and 1949 
and the communists had been involved as the main organizers. 
T. Nagi Reddy, a prominent leader in the Telangana Rebellion, 
stepped down from his position both in the assembly and the 
CPM to become the leader of the Andhra Naxalite movement 
around Telangana. In the Srikakulam area, a schoolteacher 
named Venpatapu Satyanarayana led the communist 
mobilization among peasants and tribals58. Even though the 
first Naxalite event in Andhra Pradesh was not reported in the 
media until November 1968, content analysis and the 1969 
map (see figure 3) demonstrate that Naxalite activities in the 
state soon reached an extraordinary tempo and intensity59. 
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In marked contrast to the reluctant acquiescence of the West 
Bengal government and the open defiance of the Kerala 
government, the Andhra leaders were less ambiguous and 
more eager for assistance from the central intelligence and 
security apparatuses in their campaign against the Naxalites. 
Both Indira Gandhi’s Congress-led Union government and 
the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee exerted a strong 
influence on the decisions of the state. The Congress 
Committee urged the Chief Minister that the inhabitants of the 
Khamam and Warrangal districts form self-defense leagues to 
fight the Naxalites and requested that the state government 
furnish such leagues with guns60.  
The objective for the Andhra Pradesh government was 
also highly distinct: while the state made use of the Union 
government’s Preventive Detention Act and the Arms Act 
to arrest the Telangana Naxalites, it targeted the Srikakulam 
Naxalites for extermination via its own police force and the 
Central Reserve Police. The clearly articulated goals related 
to tribal identity in Srikakulam had posed a problem for the 
Andhra Pradesh government. Content analysis suggests 
that the brutality of the police action in Srikakulam was 
unmatched elsewhere between 1967 and 1969: 13 references 
to the police killing Naxalites in various forests and hills of 
Srikakulam were made and, unlike in Kerala or West Bengal, 
no corresponding efforts at arrests were documented in news 
reports. 
The state response to the Srikakulam arm of the Naxalite 
uprising, the most conspicuously, distinctly, and self-
consciously adivasi of the three in consideration, can be 
best characterized as necropolitics. In Achille Mbembe’s 
conceptualization of necropolitics, colonial and postcolonial 
spaces represent spaces of exception and the lives of the 
denizens of such spaces are equated with savage life and 
animal life. As a result, it is not always necessary for the 
colonial or occupying state to exercise disciplinary power 
or biopower against these populations. In these spaces, 
exercising necropower by killing without being subject 
to juridical-institutional rules in the name of prolonging 
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 05 No. 03 // 2015
20
“civilization” can be easily justified61. In the exceptional 
spaces of the hills and forests of Srikakulam, the “primitive” 
and “savage” girijans became the objects of necropower 
exercised by the Andhra Pradesh government and they were 
exterminated at will without the mediation of law between 
1967 and 196962. These were followed up by routine updates 
on the number of Naxalites detained and killed by these 
security forces all throughout 196963. No other state followed 
the danda, daroga and data containment model of the centre 
so closely or with such brutality during the first three years of 
the Naxalite movement.
Conclusion
The Naxalite movement continues to figure as a subject of 
media scrutiny, state security responses and development 
initiatives, academic interrogation, and communist 
mobilization 47 years after the tragic events in Naxalbari. 
The peasant mobilization and the subsequent massacre 
at Naxalbari were hardly isolated incidents in the charged 
political landscape of late 1960s India. The May 25th episode 
hence quickly became the emblem and the spark plug of a 
revolution that spread to multiple Indian states, most notably 
affecting Kerala and Andhra Pradesh (in addition to West 
Bengal) between 1967 and 1969. 
Certain synchronies in rural and urban class structures across 
India, especially within peasants and students respectively, of 
course explain the longevity of the movement to some extent. 
Discriminations related to hierarchies of ethnicity, caste and 
gender coincided with and amplified many of the insurgents’ 
class-based alienation64. Even when the limbs of the state were 
disaggregated and sometimes actively engaged in conflict 
with each other, the state responses to the Naxalites followed 
the general idiom of danda, daroga and data. The similarity 
of state strategies practised across the distinct apparatuses 
of the Union government and local administrations only 
served to deepen the Naxalite rebels’ hostility to the Indian 
polity as it existed and inoculated them further against the 
promised parliamentarian path to liberation and autonomy. 
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Simultaneously, their unrelenting resistance strengthened the 
state’s discourse of securitization.
If Naxalbari is central to bringing the postcolonial Indian state’s 
failings and lack of hegemony to the surface, as Ranajit Guha 
has suggested, what does the sheer tenacity of the Naxalite 
struggle say about the present conditions of the Indian state 
and its relationship to the subaltern65?  The Naxalites clearly 
are resistant to state hegemony, but they are not indifferent 
to state power. The CPML’s attempts to create village soviets 
in the 1960s and the current Maoist local administrations 
in Naxalite stronghold areas are genealogically linked. The 
communist focus on state power (always figured against an 
ideal vision of the Indian state) has paradoxically drawn the 
state ever closer through Maoist reproductions of state-like 
formations and the state’s infiltration through the co-option of 
locals as special forces police officers, workers in development 
projects, and participants in youth militias66. The dialectic 
connection between the Naxalite movement and the Indian 
state is undeniable. To fully comprehend where the movement 
and the state form are headed in the future, it would be 
beneficial to continue to study the underexplored facets of 
the struggle, especially those related to its complex and hybrid 
social bases.
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...what does the sheer tenacity of 
the Naxalite struggle say about the 
present conditions of the Indian 
state and its relationship to the 
subaltern?
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Table 2: Appendix A
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2014 Critical Approaches to South Asian Studies Workshop, 
organized by the South Asia Research Group at York University. 
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plicity of sites, these papers challenge the borders of ‘South 
Asia’ and expand the concerns addressed within, including: 
challenging US hegemony through an Islamist critique of liber-
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